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Abstract:      
In this paper, we bring to light the link between immigration in France and the appeal 
to its welfare system: familial assistance, retirement, health, housing assistance, 
unemployment benefits and RMI (the French Minimum Guaranteed Income). Our results 
show that when we control for differences in characteristics between natives and immigrants, 
the over representation of migrants among the beneficiaries of social protection  is noticed 
only for unemployment benefits and for the RMI (in addition to an over representation also on 
housing assistance, in particular for the populations born in North Africa. 
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Immigration and its dependence on the 
welfare system: The case of France 
 
 
 
1. Introduction and context 
 
The question of international migrations has a very important place in the current 
political debates in France. Although many papers in economics have already raised the issue 
of the impact of migrations, either from the point of view of the source country or the 
destination country, a few questions remain. Some of them are difficult to answer because of 
a lack of data and some of them arise again after a first old “consensus” because of the 
emergence of new points (that is the case for the debate over the impact of immigration for 
the host countries with the “new” questions of the role of the welfare state and its equilibria). 
Thus for a few decades, an important literature has been developed about these vast and 
politically sensible questions. 
 
One part of this literature has concentrated on the impact of emigration for the source 
countries (Docquier & Rapoport, 2007, dealing with the well known debate between brain 
drain and brain gain. On the one hand, the departure of people lowers the development of the 
human potential of the country, especially if emigrants are skilled individuals. The source 
country looses it’s best educated workers (Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974; Blomqvist, 1986). But, 
on the other hand, the opportunity to leave one’s country to hope for higher incomes and 
better living conditions can be an incentive for the agent to develop his education. As 
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everyone cannot finally migrate because of the quantitative restrictions imposed by the 
destination countries, some skilled workers stay in their home country and contribute to its 
development (Beine & al, 2007). Moreover, emigrants also remit to their community of origin 
(Lucas & Stark, 1985) and repatriate financial and human capital together with some technical 
know-how (Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003, Mountford, 1997, Beine & al, 2001). This 
debate is thus still open, partly because of a lack of reliable and complete data and also 
because of questions on the appropriate specification of empirical models (Beine & al, 2009). 
 
Another part of the literature focused on the effects of immigration in the host 
countries. The central question here is to examine if immigration imply a decrease of local 
wages of the natives and/or a slump in job opportunities in the labor market. This debate 
received a fairly early negative answer; the explanation for that is that the flow of migrants is 
actually diluted in the mass of local people and jobs (Borjas, 1990; Friedberg & Hunt, 1995; 
Oudinet, 2005; Malchow-Moller & al 2009). A more recent discussion emerged after the 
initial papers of Borjas (2001, 2003; see also Ottaviano & Peri, 2008), who claimed that this 
common result could be explained by a wrong methodology. Till then, the papers used to 
compare the regions with mass immigration to those without immigration, with spatial 
correlation models, and with the purpose of pointing at the disparities between the wages and 
the job opportunities in both. As they did not observe sensitive evolutions in the regions 
impacted by migrations, they concluded on the absence of any impact. Nevertheless, this 
methodology actually occults some potential effects if people reallocate between different 
regions. Indeed, Borjas (2001) pointed that natives who enter in competition with the new 
immigrants hold an interest to move to regions with less immigrants, so as to preserve their 
position in the labor market. In the same way, always looking at things with a global 
perspective, firms with special needs for non expensive labor hold the interest to move into 
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the regions with immigrants and then create new jobs in these places. It means that the 
immigration impacts have to be observed throughout the whole country and not only 
comparing immigration counties with non immigration ones. Under this methodology, some 
reallocation effects appear consequently to immigration. Some economic actors become net 
winners (firms with high needs in low skill labor, and skilled workers, who are 
complementary to unskilled people). Others become net losers (the unskilled natives, who 
face a greater competition with immigrants). The global (net) effect of immigration otherwise 
still doesn’t manifest itself very strongly. 
 
More recently, the literature has turned to the question of the impact of immigration on 
the financial balance of the welfare state. The question is: do immigrant people contribute 
more to the welfare state than they benefit from it? Told differently, could the welfare state be 
an incentive in itself for migrating and then could it tend to attract people who would be 
adversely self-selected (that is people with such attributes that they will be net recipients from 
the social benefits)? This debate appeared few years ago in the United-States of America with 
the first study of Borjas and what was called the “welfare magnet effect” (1999). 
 
At the origin of this debate in the USA stands the increase of the wage gap between 
natives and immigrants over the last 50 years. Whereas there was a 17% wage gap before 
1965 and the setting up of the immigration restrictive policy, it reached 32% in 1997. The 
difference can be attributed to a change in the nature of the recent immigration flows, which 
come from poorer countries and are less educated flows (Borjas, 1990, 1999). Furthermore, 
even after controlling for social and demographic attributes, overdependence to the welfare 
state persists for immigrants, especially when all kinds of assistance (financial but also non 
financial aids, such as free medical assistance, the soup kitchen, etc.) are taken into account 
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(Borjas & Hilton, 1996)
2
. Thus, a special effect of being an immigrant seems to exist. Several 
phenomenons could explain this finding. First, because of the huge disparities between 
average incomes in the origin country compared with the host country, some immigrated 
households could consider social benefits as a sufficient way of earning their lives and so 
decide not to take a job (Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003, 2009). Another common explanation 
comes from the role of networks constituted by previous migrants; indeed, previous migrants 
can inform later immigrants about their rights and eligibility for social assistance they could 
take advantage of. Taking this point of view a bit further, this would also mean that if the 
network is well developed (spread over several countries), then immigration applicants can 
choose their destination under this information (Borjas & Hilton, 1996). However, this 
argument has to be empirically evaluated because it could be reversed: the network can gather 
useful information about job opportunities, which would decrease social dependence instead 
of increasing it (Hao & Yukio, 2001). 
 
If the debate has received a considerable attention in the United States, it doesn’t have 
received the same attention in other countries until now, presumably because of the difficulty 
to find suitable data. Yet, Following Borjas, few scare studies have been facing European 
countries. As far as we now, the existing studies concern Germany, two Nordic countries 
(Denmark and Sweden), United-Kingdom and Ireland. A special European report from 
Brücker & al (2002), based on the European Panel (ECHP) have also dealt with 11 European 
countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, 
Greece, Finland, Spain and Portugal) between 1994 and 1996, but with few detailed analysis 
for each one. The results of these European studies do not make a complete consensus. 
                                                        
2
 See Jensen (1988) for a study on monetary assistance only. 
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From a general and statistical point of view, migrants benefit more from the social system 
than natives, but the gap is weak and not systematic. It depends on the country or on the type 
of assistance considered. Thus, the dependence upon unemployment benefits appear to hold 
the most important difference between migrants and natives, even if it is not the case in 
Germany, UK, Greece, Spain or Portugal (for these countries, the dependence of migrants is 
the same than for the natives, or even inferior). Logically, natives receive old age pensions 
more often: whatever the country which is considered, there are much fewer “old” immigrants 
than “old” natives. In other words, migrants are younger than natives and even if they have 
spent their whole working life in their host country, they may not gather all the needed 
conditions to apply for an old age pension. The case of familial benefits is also different 
between countries. The Netherlands, France and Austria remit more familial benefits to 
migrants than to natives. No gap can be observed among other countries. From an aggregated 
point of view (all benefits included), taking into account the migrants’ characteristics, the 
study of Brücker & al (2002) shows that immigrants have a slightly higher probability to 
benefit from social assistance, but that the difference remains extremely weak. The other 
studies, focused only on one or two countries, deliver more details. Whatever the period, the 
same result holds for Germany: the overdependence of immigrants totally disappears when 
controlling for the characteristics of the households: holding everything constant, migrants do 
not depend more from the social assistance than natives (Brücker & al, 2002; Riphahn, 1998, 
2004; Castronova & al, 2001). But Germany seems the only case where we observe such a 
result. Ireland is another special case but, contrary to Germany and to other countries, 
immigrants in Ireland are less dependent from social assistance (Barrett & McCarthy, 2007, 
2008). This could be a consequence of the high skilled level of immigrants in this country, or 
just the result of the conditions of eligibility to welfare (people need to be settled since at least 
2 years before being authorized to apply for any assistance). For every other country, 
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immigrants appear more dependent than native people, with some peculiarities between 
countries (in Sweden, the dependence decreases with duration (Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003) 
conversely to Denmark where it remains as heavy as during the first months (Nannestad, 
2004)). 
Thereby we often are back to the conclusion of Brücker & al (2002), also emphasized by the 
papers of Borjas: differences in the objective characteristics of migrants do not explain the 
overall gap in the dependence to the welfare system. A “residual effect” persists. This effect 
can be due to the discrimination toward migrants, network effects, or the impact of non-
observable characteristics
3
. 
 
Despite these surveys, the question of the welfare magnet is still a point of interest for 
economic research, especially for countries with no or only few studies on it. As we said, 
France is in this case. Moreover, since July 2006, the French government slowly introduced a 
selective migration policy. So the questions are strong about the real budget impact of 
immigrants in France and about the expected efficiency (or inefficiency) of that kind of 
political position. Our study completes previous works realized in Europe, and focus on the 
French case
4
. The case of France was scarcely studied even if this country if one of the very 
first migration receiving countries in Europe. We use the same empirical methodology as 
foreign studies to ask if the observed statistical overdependence of immigrants to the French 
                                                        
3  These  characteristics  could  play  an  important  role.  For  example,  we  can  think  about  the  different 
abilities, a gap in the motivation, etc. A few studies (Riphahn, 1998; Hansen & Lofstrom, 2009 for example) 
specify these differences of motivation through differences in behavior: preference for the leisure rather than for 
labor will lead to different choices in term of labor offer. If migrants have an increasing preference for the leisure 
and if their wage requirement is higher to accept an offer, they will be more willing to make the choice to stay at 
home and to ask for social benefits. 
4 The work of Brücker and al (2002) is the only one that proposes few results about France.  
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welfare state remains when we control for their peculiar attributes. In order to check this 
assumption, we propose first some descriptive statistics to present the picture of the current 
French immigration and the link between this immigration and the appeal to the welfare 
system (section 2). In section 3, we will estimate the probability to receive social benefits, 
depending on the geographic origin and controlling for the characteristics of the individuals. 
Section 4 will then conclude and propose some discussion about migration policies. 
 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
This section is first devoted to a brief description of our data (2.1). In a second time, 
we tell some words on the nature of immigration in France, which differs from the usual 
picture of the “representative international migrant” described in the literature (2.2). We will 
finally present descriptive statistics on the dependence on the welfare system for each 
population (2.3). 
 
 
 
2.1. Description of the dataset 
 
To test our hypothesis about the links between the status of being an immigrant person 
and the dependence on the welfare state, we need data which combine socio-demographic 
descriptions, professional information about people and the sources of incomes, especially 
those coming from social assistance. In France, the INSEE (the French National Institute for 
Statistical and Economic Studies) provides such a dataset with the survey ‘budget des 
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familles”. We use the latest disposable survey (2006). We thus have information on the 
individuals and households who live in France, their expenses, resources and different kinds 
of consumption. All details are provided in a desegregated way, excepted for the countries of 
origin as we will see later. We merged the “households dataset” which contained 10240 
observations and the “individuals dataset” (25364 observations) and then we obtained a 
complete dataset with 17061 adult individuals (aged 18 years old or more). 
Among the 17061 individuals, about 46% are men and 54% are women. The 
population is fairly distributed between each age group except for the 18-29 years old group. 
Concerning this one, the staff is lower because we skipped the 15-18 years old in order to take 
into account only individuals in age to take a migration decision on their own. 
 
Immigrant people can be identified by two different statistics: the nationality and the 
place of birth. Following the first criterion, we have 15365 French individuals whereas 979 
individuals would belong to the group of the “other nationalities” (country of the UE-15 
keeping France apart, North African countries (Maghreb), Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.). The 
second criterion (the place of birth) leaves about 2000 persons born out of France. We use this 
last criterion for several reasons. First it allows to work with a higher number of observations 
and then to produce more significant results. A second reason comes from the naturalization 
phenomenon (defined as the acquisition of the nationality of the country where the individual 
live without being born in this country). This phenomenon generates a gap between the 
proportion of migrants defined in reference to the country of birth and the proportion of 
migrants defined by the criterion of nationality. This gap is eye catching concerning the 
population from North Africa in France: immigrants from North Africa (743 individuals, 
4.35%) often adopt the French nationality, and then induce a decrease in the North Africans' 
nationalities in proportion (the number falls to 1.5 % or 257 persons). To a lesser extent, it is 
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also the case for the “other European” people, who represent 4% of the sample if we relate to 
the country of birth, but only 2.3% if we consider the nationality (tables 1 and 2). 
 
Table 1: distribution according to the place of birth  -  about here 
 
 
Table 2: distribution according to the nationality    about here 
 
The last reason to hold a criterion based on the country of origin and not on the 
nationality is that the opposite choice would prevent us from some explanations for our 
results. Let us simply quote two examples. Firstly, a change of nationality does not prevent 
from discrimination (a first name, last name or just the color of the skin can be used as a 
signal to exclude you from the labor market). In the same spirit, changing nationality will not 
necessarily change one’s way of living, preferences and so on. If the overdependence on 
social assistance is linked with either one or the other of these two possible explanations, then 
a geographical origin criterion will better capture them. Table 3 summarizes the previous 
results according to groups of ages and bringing every non native places of birth together. 
 
Table 3: Distribution by age according to the grouped countries of birth about here 
To close the discussion on that point, note that we do not identify precisely the 
children born in France but from foreigner or foreign-born parents. These children appear in 
our data as natives as they’re born in France. Moreover, at the age of 18, few of them choose 
to renounce to the French nationality even if they could do it under the law. Of course, these 
people may be discriminated just like their parents were, or they may behave the same way 
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and make similar choices. But we do not have the information on the origin of each 
individual’ parents in our dataset. Then we cannot deal with the second or third immigrant 
generations. In order to better understand the relationship between immigrant people and the 
welfare state, the following section presents some statistical results especially on their 
position to the job market. 
 
2.2.  Description of the French immigration 
 
An abundant literature has dealt with the question of the motivations to migrate and 
the characteristics of international migrants since the initial paper of Sjaastad (1962). Just 
considering the empirical facts that some regions were sending emigrants but also receiving 
immigrants in the same time, he put the light on the important role of the costs of migration 
adding to a vast number of possible incentives. Actually, people do not only react to 
disparities in the average observed incomes in two areas but take into account the chances to 
obtain a job (Harris & Todaro, 1970), the conditions of living, the amenities and also the 
monetary and psychological costs before making their decision to move or not. Many factors 
may influence the final decision so that it is difficult to predict the net migration flow within a 
specific region or area. Conversely, the literature has managed to describe the main attributes 
of international migrants. The “typical migrant” would be a skilled man, relatively rich 
compared to others at the origin (so that he can afford the moving cost), and who is seeking 
for a better level of income, better conditions of living for him as well as for his children and 
community (Greenwood, 1985). This picture holds true as far as the migration choice is a free 
decision, at the opposite of forced migrations (induced by wars, persecution or climate 
disasters). But this portrait has to be put in perspective because several institutional and 
political factors can play a big role in the composition of migration flows. To illustrate that 
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idea, the case of France is a pretty good example. France has built long historical relations 
with some well identified countries in which it has dug up an important workforce after the 
Second World War and for 30 years approximately. Nowadays, the major proportion of its 
immigration comes from these countries (it has been the case of Italy and Portugal until a 
recent period, then these flows have nearly stopped and left the place for North-African flows 
which now constitute the majority of the annual flows). In addition, facing economical 
difficulties in the middle of the 1970s, France tried to stop immigration and to encourage 
return migrations. So the family entry and settlement motivation to immigrate grew very fast 
at the expense of labor motives. Jugging from the census of 1999, approximately 70% of non-
European foreigners settled in France thanks to familial reasons, compared to 40% in the case 
of migrants from the European Economic Area (Lebon, 2001). These proportions remain 
stable over time. Thus, the inflow in 2003 was composed of 79% of persons accepted thanks 
to this familial criterion (Insee, 2005). We can notice that French immigration mainly 
corresponds to an immigration flow from the poorest countries: Algeria (18% of entries in 
2005), Morocco (15%), Turkey (7%), and Tunisia (6%). Other nationalities that immigrate in 
France represent a much weaker flow. Our data obviously are in connection with those well-
known remarks. 
 
We have put in appendix the tables presenting classical statistics on the size and composition 
of families. As expected, households composed with only one person are more numerous in 
the native population whereas foreign born households, especially those from North African 
are more often in couple and have children (appendix 1 and 2). The most important statistics 
for our concern are those relating the skill levels of the different populations and their 
professional positions. The first assessment reveals that individuals born abroad are on 
average much less skilled than natives (table 4). 
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Table 4: skill level according to the geographical origin    about here 
 
The skill levels reported here correspond to the higher skill level at the date of the 
survey. They can have been performed in France or abroad. About half of agents born abroad 
(49%) do not overpass the middle school, compared with 34% among the individuals born in 
France. These statistics are conformed to those published by the French institute of statistics 
based on the French Census of Population (for example, 41% of unskilled people among 
migrants compared with 21% among natives in 2005). On the other hand, the highest share of 
unskilled people (maximum middle school) is observed among individuals from European 
countries (56% have no more than this educational level), who are followed by individuals 
from North Africa (51%) and other Africans (closed to 41%). A few migrants (15.38%) 
compared with the natives (29%) reach short and professional training such as the French 
CAP (Vocational training qualifications), BEP of other professional certificates. Nevertheless, 
situations are not exactly the same according to the precise geographical origin of migrants. If 
all migrants are less represented than natives in this category of skill level, Africans are the 
least represented, followed by other Europeans, North African people and French individuals 
even if the gap between the last two groups reaches not less than 10 percentage points. At the 
opposite, the share of holders of high school diploma is the same among all groups of 
population (except for Europeans who are still weakly represented). It is also the case 
concerning graduates of the higher education (that is the University, with all its levels 
merged). The last striking fact is the following: 23.5% of Africans have a certificate which 
corresponds to “High school diploma +3 or 4 years studying”. It is far from all other 
categories, including natives. They are also more represented on the category of high 
diplomas (High school diploma +5 and more (Ph-D, etc.)). This acquisition can have been 
made after the migration, in France, and this may even be the migration motive, but we can’t 
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check this assumption because we have no information about the date or the age when the 
agent arrived in France. 
 
Now, let’s consider the occupational positions of each population. Table 5 first shows 
individual positions with respect to the labor market. 57% of the natives have a job, compared 
to only 49% among individuals born abroad. At the opposite, unemployment affects 10% of 
immigrants against twice less (5.33%) for natives
5
. Housewives (or househusband) are also 
more represented among foreigners than among French (13 % against 6.5 %). Job access is 
different between migrants and natives, and mainly between migrants from North Africa and 
others. While the former are less than 42% to get a job, the proportion gets around 50% on 
average for the rest of the population. A clear difference appears between Europeans and non-
Europeans as 5% of the immigrated population is jobless for the first ones compared with 
10% for the second ones. Finally, note the peculiarity of the Africans’ situation as this 
category has simultaneously the best rate of people holding a job (except for the natives) but 
also the worst rate according to the rate of jobless people compared to other populations. That 
means that intermediate positions (retired, etc.) are on average much less frequent among 
these people. 
 
Table 5: Main situation with regard to the labor market    about here 
Concerning the retirement situation, we can notice that a few numbers of Africans in 
France get a pension. They probably have not accumulated all the conditions required to get 
                                                        
5
 This rate is lower than the national average (between 8% and 10% for the last decade). This is partly due to a 
sampling effect: the unemployment rate among the overall population is “only” 5.94% here, which is under-
evaluated compared with the national rate (between 8 and 10% for the last ten years). 
 15 
an old age pension. Natives and North Africans experiment equal shares of dependence, and 
30% of other Europeans settled in France benefit from an old age pension. 
 
To turn finally to the last part of our description, we have isolated employed 
individuals and captured the type of work they carry out (table 6). Before commenting the 
results, a few words on the French labor contracts may be useful. The main type of contract is 
what is called the “CDI” (namely “unlimited duration contract) which basically corresponds 
to the labor contracts in other countries (once hired, the agent keeps his job unless he is fired). 
More than three quarters of the salaries in France hold this type of contract. They can be 
either full-time or part-time employees. The second main type of contract is called “CDD” 
(limited duration contract). This contract anticipates the date at which the work relationship 
will end (the employee can be full-time or part time here again). Besides these two forms of 
contracts, many others exist. Some of them are common abroad too, just like apprenticeship 
or temporary jobs. Others are specifically French and come from successive political choices. 
They are public financed jobs, with a fixed term. Our results show yet very small differences 
between the situation of employed immigrants and natives. Gaps mainly concern two groups: 
jobs in fixed duration and “full-time CDI”: migrants are more represented in these types of 
jobs. Nevertheless, even in those cases, gaps remain relatively low and weakly significant. 
Then we conclude that differences among natives and non-natives are more important 
considering the accessibility to the labor market (employment vs. unemployment) than 
considering the type of job once the person has been hired. As observed by the French 
national institute of statistics, different situations exist in term of social and occupational 
sectors. Traditionally, we find migrants (mainly from Africa) carrying out unskilled jobs in 
industrial sectors, in the building and public works or in the services to the persons (Insee, 
2005) but the main point of interest is the one of the accessibility to the job market. 
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Table 6: job situation of the working population about here 
 
To sum up our comments, differences in human capital and thus positions in the labor 
market are important between natives and immigrants, particularly among non-European 
ones. Migrants are more likely to be less educated, and “out of job”. When they get a job, they 
often carry out unstable jobs. Thus, we expect to find these differences in the rates of appeal 
to the welfare system according to the geographical origin. It would mainly concern 
unemployment benefits and RMI (Minimum Guaranteed Income), which are supposed to land 
in the difficulties connected to the professional life. We have also underlined earlier some 
differences in lifestyles, particularly in the number of children per household. We thus expect 
to observe gaps in the dependence to familial assistance. The following section proposes some 
descriptive statistics on the relationship between migrations and the welfare system. 
 
2.3. Descriptive statistics concerning dependence of migrants t the welfare system  
 
This section proposes a statistical overview about the appeal to the welfare system in 
France. First, it is necessary to define what we mean with the “welfare system” in our study. 
In this paper, we consider old age pensions, familial assistance (grouped with familial benefits 
and scholarship), health reimbursement, housing assistance, unemployment benefits and the 
RMI. Table 7 presents the number of agents using these services by places of birth (France, 
Europe, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and others); it corresponds to the probability 
that the agents benefit from these disposals, whatever the amounts they receive. 
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Table 7: probabilities of being a beneficiary of the welfare system according to the 
geographical origin             about here 
 
 
a. The health insurance and the incapacity
6
 
The category which is the most numerous to benefit from this disposal is the European 
one (8.23% of European immigrants compared with 5.58% for the natives). North Africans 
are also a bit more numerous to benefit from this assistance, but the gap is narrow (6.46% 
against 5.58%). Other foreign born people are fewer to be dependent on this allocation. The 
nationality criterion, which we also tested, does not bring any additional explanation. 
 
b. Retirements
7
 
Among the individuals born in France, one person out of three gets a pension on 
average. This share is weakly more important among the North Africans, but the gap is 
extremely low. Europeans receive more often old age pensions, which reminds one of our 
previous remarks: the proportion of retired people among European immigrants in France is 
high. At the opposite, immigrants from other origins are three times less numerous than the 
natives getting old age pensions in France. This is also in accordance with what we 
emphasized before: these populations may face some problems to gather the necessary 
conditions to receive such a pension. 
 
c. Familial assistance
8
 
                                                        
6
 This post includes disabled persons allowances, invalid allowances, pensions of war veterans or war victim, 
daily allowances for maternity (maternity hospital), for disease or accident. 
7
 This post includes the basic pensions (including reversion pensions), the early retirements (base and 
additional), minimum old age and the allocations to the dependent old persons. 
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The Sub-Saharan Africans benefit more often from the familial assistance (40%), 
which is consistent with the previous descriptive statistics as we showed that they had more 
children on average than other people. As this allocation depends on the size of the family, 
our observation is not surprising at all. North African people also receive this assistance more 
often than natives (27% compared with 24%) and than other Europeans (23%). 
 
d. Housing benefits
9
 
Important gaps appear concerning this assistance. Non-European migrants get three 
times more often housing benefits. At the opposite, we do not observe an important gap 
between Sub-Saharan Africans and North Africans (about 34% benefits from housing 
assistance). 
 
e. Unemployment benefits 
The dependence to the unemployment benefits is more important among non-natives. 
Less than 12% of natives receive this assistance, compared to 13% among Europeans settled 
in France, more than 18% among North Africans and 20% among people from another origin 
(Sub-Saharan Africa and others). This result is not surprising with regard to gaps described 
before concerning the access to the labor market. 
It is interesting to observe these results from a nationality point of view (see appendix 
3). We can notice that the French “by acquisition” (that is people who became French through 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8
 The device integrates the basic welfare as well as the family benefits. We find the family complement, the 
allocation for young child, the allocation for children going back to school, the single-parent allocation, the 
assistant to the child care there, the educational parental allocation, the allocation of family support, the special 
education allocation, the allocation employment approved nursery assistant, child minder's allocation, allocation 
adoption, the allocation parental presence, the allocation reception young child ( PAJE), and the allocation city 
hall or the other social welfare body. 
9
 It corresponds to the APL (housing subsidy) and the social or family rent allocation (ALF, ALS). 
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acquisition of the French nationality) receive clearly more often unemployment benefits than 
natives (17.4% compared with 11%). Thus, being a migrant seems to play an important role in 
itself and the acquisition of the French nationality does not eliminate all the differences that 
could be linked to the geographical origins: differences in human capital (i.e: skill levels of 
agents), discrimination according to the place of birth (that continues to be identifiable 
through consonance of names / first names, skin color or an accent for example), etc. 
Conversely, the information on the acquisition of the local nationality or not does not bring 
any differences if we focus on European migrants: The same situation can be observed for 
Sub-Saharan Africans. At the opposite, we can notice an important share of North African 
people who receive unemployment benefits when they are nationalized: 26.85% (while the 
rate was lower than 20% when we considered the country of birth). Besides, we know that 
this population represents the largest part of  requests of acquisition of nationality (Insee 
2005). But clearly the acquisition of the French nationality does not prevent them from 
professional difficulties. On the other hand, concerning people who did not acquired the 
French nationality, the situation in the labor market seems to be even more difficult, so that 
asking for a naturalization process appears to have profitable professional consequences. 
Nevertheless, this could actually be due to an endogenous relation. Indeed, out of the 
traditional familial way, the acquisition of the French nationality has to be decided by the 
public authority, under few conditions (being 18 years old at least, living regularly in France, 
etc.). On top of these conditions, the discretionary appreciation of the authorities plays a 
crucial role. Consequently, as a successful integration into the labor market can constitute a 
decisive factor for the decision, the correlation between the naturalized status and the quality 
of the professional integration is not really surprising. Moreover, in any case, even if the 
current professional position were not a determinant point of decision, the ability to speak 
French currently remains one, so that the correlation between the naturalization and the 
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probability to be on a job (which is itself strongly correlated with the local language ability) is 
still at work (Chiswick and Miller, 1995). 
 
f. RMI (the French Minimum Guaranteed Income) 
The RMI is an even much better representation of the consequences suffered when 
individuals are excluded from the labor market. For these statistics, we have deleted people 
under 25 years old, who are not concerned by this disposal. A striking result may be 
underlined here: whereas a few number of native people and European ones receive that kind 
of public support (approximately 2% in each case), more than 8% of African people (North 
and sub-Saharan Africans mixed-up) benefit from this form of assistance. Furthermore, as for 
the unemployment benefits, the results obtained changing the criterion of the place of birth for 
this of nationality show a clear impact of the naturalization. If we skip sub-Saharan and North 
African migrants who became French after such a request, the rate of dependence to the RMI 
is huge for these two categories. Nevertheless, once again the dependence among French 
people by acquisition is up to that of French people by origin, suggesting that the acquisition 
of the host nationality do not resolve everything for people with difficulties to go into the 
labor market. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section, we estimate econometrically the correlations underlined in the previous 
section. We follow the same methodology as the former studies published for other countries 
(see introduction) studying the link between the fact of being an immigrant person and the 
nature of the dependence on the welfare state. Is this correlation still so heavy when we take 
into account intrinsic differences between people? And if the answer is yes, then how could 
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we interpret such a strong causality? Here the literature proposes some potential explanations 
dealing with additional elements such as discrimination issues or different sociological 
behaviors. 
 
3.1. Methodology and the specification of the estimated equation 
 
Our model of estimation is very similar to those of previous studies (Brücker and alii 
(2002) for Europe, Borjas and Hilton (1996) for the United States, Hansen and Lofstrom 
(2003) for Sweden, Castronova and al. (2001) for Germany and Barrett and McCarthy (2007, 
2008) for Ireland and the United Kingdom) in so far as we could obtain the information we 
needed for France. Control variables then include first some information on individual 
personal and sociological characteristics: the gender of each person (sex), her/his belonging to 
a specifically age group (age), her/his matrimonial status (matr) and the number of children 
she/he has (nbenf). For this last variable, some comments hold. As this is the main criteria to 
determine the ability and also the amount of receiving some types of aiding (particularly 
familial aiding), we naturally expect this variable to play the major role for this particular 
estimation on familial assistance. Nonetheless, we also included this information in the other 
equations estimated as we expect such a situation to have impacts on individual behaviors and 
then on the dependence on other disposals of the welfare state. The problem is that the size of 
the family (and so the number of children) can influence people in two opposite ways. On the 
one hand, having more children could deter people from taking a job because of the child-
linked constraints and the possibility to apply to assistance. But on the other hand, raising 
more children could also create an incentive to work more (taking a full-time job for instance 
in spite of a part-time one) in order to provide all their needs, which would hardly be provided 
by the sole benefit of an assistance. Similar expectations could be made upon the role of the 
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matrimonial status. Living alone either offers you the liberty to take a full-time job just as it 
imposes you to act this way to some degree because you have no other source of revenue (no 
spouse’s wage). But on the other hand as a single household you may have a slower income 
and then be eligible to a complement from social assistance. Conversely, a twosome 
household will generally benefit from larger revenues if wages come from the two individuals 
but they can make the choice not to work both, in order to raise children. In that case, the 
household’ global income may be sufficiently low to open rights to social assistance. The last 
variable we introduced to describe personal sociological and demographical characteristics, 
except for the place of birth which is our main concern (nais), is the place of living within 
French territory (hab). We hope to catch some effects of the degree of urbanization here on 
the situation of people. Indeed, France holds obviously different kind of places with respect to 
their population and job densities. Just to take an example, living in Paris gives you more 
chances to find a job than living in a very rural region. The welfare state may then be needless 
for you. 
 
Besides these sociological characteristics, we also put in the model some information on the 
human capital of each individual. The first one corresponds to the educational attainment 
(dipl), which we expect to act like a protective device against unemployment and exclusion 
from the labor market. The dependence on the related welfare disposals may then decrease 
with the number of years of education. Depending on the model estimated, we also introduced 
either the professional position (catsoc) and/or the situation facing the labor market (situa). 
Each model is run separately under the logistic method (which allows us to recover the odd 
ratios for the interpretations) and includes the most pertinent variables among those presented 
above. The last item which appears in the following equations, ε, refers to the error term and 
concentrates the distance between the estimated coefficients and the real ones. We present 
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here after the six equations modeled, each representing a specific disposal of the French 
welfare state
10
. 
 
(eq 1) Housing: 
 
(eq 2) Health: 
 
(eq 3) Family: 
 
(eq 4) Retirment: 
 
(eq 5) Unemployment: 
 
(eq 6) RMI : 
 
 
3.2. The results 
Table 10 coming hereafter presents the overall results coming from econometric 
regressions (1) to (6). Each one has been run on 17061 observations, except for the one of 
“RMI”, which ran over fewer observations as we deleted people under 25 years old, who 
cannot apply for this disposal. More generally otherwise, the French legislation is very simple 
concerning the eligibility to social assistance: everyone who is currently living in France can 
apply to it, is he/she a (legal) migrant or a native person. No condition of residing duration 
hold. 
                                                        
10
 All models have been run with the SAS software. 
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The result of each explanatory variable is given according to a reference variable. 
Appendixes 4 to 6 present the overall results: coefficients, standard errors of regressions and 
the odds ratio. To be as clear as possible, table 8 proposes a synthetic view with only the odd 
ratios, which allow an easy lecture of the results: a ratio up to 1 means that the concerned 
group of individuals experiment a higher probability to receive the considered social income 
with regard to the reference variable. Conversely if the odd ratio is lower than 1, the 
considered group is less likely to benefit from the disposal than the group of reference. The 
results show that, controlling for different characteristics between natives and migrants, the 
over representation of migrants among the beneficiaries of the welfare system is mainly 
confirmed for the unemployment benefits and the RMI (in the top of an over representation in 
the housing assistance mainly concerning North Africans). Migrants dependence on the other 
disposals of assistance (familial benefits, health assistance and old pensions) is not 
significally different from the natives’ one. 
 
Let’s now comment these results under more details. Everything held constant, North 
African immigrants appear to have about three times more chances to receive that type of 
assistance than the natives. They have also 1.4 times more chances to receive familial 
benefits, 1.8 times to receive unemployment benefits and 3.67 times to receive the RMI. The 
same results hold for populations from Sub-Saharan Africa (though we have to notice a 
slightly weaker Odd ratio concerning the housing assistance). These two types of population, 
who are also the main part of the immigration in France, reveal the most striking results 
considering our focus. Concerning the Europeans on the contrary, only coefficients extracted 
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from the models of the health assistance
11
 and old pensions are significant, showing that they 
receive about 1.3 times more often assistance than native people. 
 
These findings have first to be related to what our descriptive statistics underlined. 
The statistics indeed currently show an overrepresentation of immigrants in almost every 
disposal of the welfare state (and especially in the familial allocation disposal but not only). 
Moreover, many arguments to close the borders are held on the basis of this 
overrepresentation which is often assimilated to a choice to live in France under this sole 
source of income. The debate on the migration question in France can sometimes then be 
turned into a debate on each one’s way of living and moved to a cultural and religion debate. 
What we are showing here is that the question of the impact of each population’s 
characteristics and sociological behaviors do not hold for every part of the welfare state and 
especially not for the two main (in terms of the amount of expenses) of it: the health 
assistance and the retirement’s one. It is relatively common sense to observe an 
overrepresentation of high size families in the disposals which are eligible under conditions of 
income and also of specific size of households (such as the familial assistance) and it is also a 
common sense not to find a residual effect of being an immigrant when these particular 
characteristics are taken into account. The opposite result would have assumed that foreign 
born residents asked for such assistance when eligible whereas native people would not. 
Remember that differences in income, that would be in the disadvantage of immigrant people 
and then could have offered an additional explanation for the observed phenomenon, cannot 
be at the origin of the observed phenomenon as this allocation in France is not given under 
                                                        
11
 The results for health assistance may be taken carefully as the model ran over less than 1000 people who 
receive this type of assistance. The robustness of the estimation can then be questioned ; the same caution holds 
for the RMI estimation, as we will remind later. 
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income conditions. The whole difference between the two basic results for familial assistance 
(the statistical one and the econometrical one) is thus due to the sole impact of disparities in 
the objective size of the families between French born people and immigrants. Nonetheless, 
that does not mean that the statistical overrepresentation of the last ones will sustain with time 
as sociological studies show a gradually adoption of the lifestyle of native people by 
immigrants, especially when the immigrants come from a lower developed country (Beine & 
al, 2008). In addition to this argument, facts also put a doubt on the role of the immigrants on 
the level of the national fecundity rate in France. If the gap between the rate of French and 
foreign born women persists ((it reaches 1.8 for French women and 2.6 for overall migrant 
women on average), the proportion of foreign women in age to have a child remains 
moderated (7%). It then contradicts the idea that fecundity in France (the highest rate of the 
whole Europe with Ireland) would be due to migrants (Héran & Pison, 2007; Toulemon, 
2004). Moreover, the distinction is also important between foreign women who keep their 
original nationality and naturalized women as the last ones tend more often to behave as the 
native women and to reduce the number of children they wish to bring up. Their fecundity 
rate then falls to 2.1, compared with 3.3 for foreign women and 1.8 for native women (Héran 
& Pison, 2007).  
 
What our results induce however is that the main issue with the immigration question 
is not a sociological or even cultural one but really an economic issue. To illustrate this point, 
just take a look at the convergence of our statistical observations and the econometrical ones! 
They are very similar. Not only did we find an overdependence of immigrants (especially 
African people) in every disposal devoted to struggle economic exclusion (unemployment 
benefits, minimum income against exclusion and also housing assistance) but our empirical 
analysis has confirmed this conclusion even when holding personal characteristics (including 
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human capital) constant. The residual effect we find here may represent the main problem our 
society face. 
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Table 8: Results (Odds Ratios) of the empirical estimations     about here 
 
First of all, immigration implies a positive global contribution to the host nation if 
people it involves can find jobs and be complements to native people. After this first 
condition is reached, immigrant people can consume, pay taxes and be a profitable 
phenomenon at the same time for the host country and also for their country of birth through 
remittances and whatever transfers of physical or human capital. Conversely, not assimilating 
immigrant people into the local labor market leads to some difficulties among which stand 
those we underline here. For equal characteristics, migrants are more often represented among 
the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits and the minimum guaranteed income. This 
residual effect does appear as a real “migrant status”. On top of that, difficulties that migrants 
cope with in the labor market are probably at the origin of the over dependence in term of the 
housing assistance. 
 
Among the variables which impact the probability of receiving unemployment benefits 
stands for instance the role of the age of the individual. The older is the agent, the best 
chances he faces to have succeeded in his job research. We do not observe here a well known 
phenomenon in France which deals with specific difficulties of the ageing workers to keep 
their job or to find another one when they are fired. The most basic explanation could simply 
be that these people in our sample are partly taken into account by other disposals (early 
retirement disposals…) as a consequence of which they do not receive unemployment 
benefits any longer. As expected, living in Paris acts, thanks to its economic dynamics, as a 
protection against the unemployment. The impact of the diploma is obviously very strong. In 
order to propose a more common way of interpreting the results, we have merged the 
modalities into only three classes: low, medium and high level of education, the first one 
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corresponding to a basic level of education attainment (under the level of high school), the 
medium one to the high school level and the last one to a university level. As expected, the 
highest the level is, the less chances the agent has to need unemployment benefits. Living 
alone multiplies the probability to need such assistance by 3.4; the lack of the spouse’s 
network can constitute one of the potential explanations; another one may yet comes from the 
difficulty of finding a job for people without a spouse but with children. 
Concerning finally the impact of the variable we wanted to test, we can observe that 
being born outside of France raises significantly the probability to need unemployment 
benefits. This probability for European people is increased by 30%, but with only little 
significance (the risk to make an error is closed to 10%). The probabilities for sub-Saharan 
and north-African migrants are respectively 62% and 80% more than the one for native 
people and these results are highly significant. This observation supports what we said in the 
introduction of this paper: a lot of immigrants in France are attracted by other factors than the 
expected wage or, if they are, they have no good information about their real chances and face 
strong professional difficulties when they come in. To comfort or soften these findings, we 
also estimated this model with the criterion of the nationality instead of the one of the place of 
birth. We expected to find disparities between those who had been naturalized and those who 
had not because of a potential interpretation of the naturalization as a signal of social 
integration that would then make easier the entry into the labor market. However, no striking 
result appears, though some peculiarities need to be emphasized (results are presented in 
appendix 7). Relatively to the French born, French naturalized people face a risk of 
unemployment 1.7 times as higher. Nationality then doesn’t solve everything! Conversely, 
keeping one’s nationality does not seem to bring many additional difficulties for European 
nationalities or even sub-Saharan ones, but it does mean that things will get worse for north-
African nationalities (the risk is near two times as high as the one for the natives). 
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If we remind that all these conclusions are made under the control for disparities in 
educational attainment especially, we have to turn to other explanations for these phenomena 
emphasized than the simplest one which would throw the responsibility of such professional 
differences on divergences in human capital. An alternative explanation can be that the skills 
acquired by a foreigner outside may not be transferable to another country (Hansen & 
Lofstrom, 2008). But the majority of our foreign born sample is few educated so that this 
cannot be the main explanation for our observations. The literature has pointed up two other 
interpretations for these results. One of them focuses on discrimination effects. Once the 
worker is not a “French” person (or does not look like a French person with European style), 
his qualification may not be considered as an advantage any more. The second one refers to 
the basic economics of labour to put the light on potential different behaviours between each 
type of population. Here the point would be that some people could make a different choice 
between the time allocated to labour and the time allocated to leisure and more generally to 
non-professional activities. The effectiveness of a welfare state could encourage the second 
choice. The question here is to arbitrate if this choice is more probable thanks to the huge gap 
between the standard of living of the source country and the host country
12
 (Hansen & 
Lofstrom, 2003, 2009; Gourévitch, 2007), or if such a choice may on the contrary be less 
likely as migrant people often aim at saving money to remit to their source country. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to discriminate between both explanations; just like the 
previous studies focused on the United States or European countries, we lack of data to do 
that. One of the potential factors that would have informed us about a potential discrimination 
is the ability to speak the local language as this ability often favours the achieving of a job 
                                                        
12 The amounts received from public assistance are not so large but could seem to be sufficient for originally 
poor people. 
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(see Chiswick & Miller, 1995 for an illustration). Nevertheless, several papers have already 
pointed that this variable is far from sufficient (as the language ability is not the only talent 
required by employers) and could even be false (as this ability could also encourage the agent 
not to work because he better knows how to apply for other sources of income, Barrett & 
McCarthy, 2008). So far as we are concerned, we do not have the information on this ability. 
The same results and main explanations seem to hold true for the estimation on the minimum 
guaranteed income (RMI). Here again the North African born face bigger probabilities to be 
in a professionally bad situation and to need this assistance (the risk is 3.7 times as high as for 
the natives). Nevertheless, this estimation ran over a very few number of beneficiaries (474 
people, whatever their country of birth) and this could throw a doubt on the robustness of our 
result. 
 
4. Conclusion and migration policy discussion 
The main aim of this paper was to clarify the links between the welfare state in France 
and the related dependence for native and immigrant people. We do not concentrate on the 
question of the attraction of such a welfare system on migration in itself as we lack 
appropriated data. But we focused on determining if the statistical dependence of immigrants 
to almost every disposal of the welfare state was robust to an econometrical analysis (i.e : to 
an analysis which would make abstraction of the differences in observed socio-demographical 
characteristics of native versus foreign born agents). The results clearly show that, holding 
these attributes constant, the overrepresentation of immigrants in each disposal disappears 
except for those related to special difficulties in the labor market (income difficulties) for 
which a residual effect remains. Two main explanations can be proposed for these results. The 
first one refers to discrimination effects that often keep foreign people out of the labor market 
or recruit them only on bad jobs (referring to the literature on the dual labor market). The 
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other one questions the choices made by both types of population concerning their willingness 
to work or to apply to public assistance. This last explanation is closer to the initial concept of 
a welfare magnet effect (Borjas, 1999). Notice that, even if the existence of a so-called 
welfare magnet being the reason to induce more immigration has been refuted by Kahanec & 
Zimmermann (2008) for Europe, both explanations could sometimes merge. Discrimination 
can play as a discouraging factor to pursue an intensive job search and then conversely 
encourage discriminated people to settle for the second best solution, namely the welfare state 
dependence. 
What is mainly striking in such a study is that the bad issues on migrations are located 
exclusively in labor market outcomes. The weight of immigration on the two main parts of the 
French welfare state (retirement pensions and the health system), whose current huge deficits 
imply severe debates in France, is not demonstrated. On the contrary, immigrants are much 
less concerned by these disposals, whereas they compose the main proportion of the 
beneficiaries of unemployment benefits, minimum guaranteed income and also housing 
allocations. This reveals their bad position on the labor market. Facing this problem, either we 
think that the main reason comes from objective characteristics of people (such as the skill 
level and so on) and we try to select better the persons who are allowed to enter. Or we 
consider that this is a question of behavioral attitudes facing the labor market and we take 
more restrictive conditions to be eligible to this type of public assistance. This last solution 
consists in a complete reappraisal of the welfare state in itself and could also destroy the 
efficiency of such assistance to allow workers and employers to find themselves after a real 
job search and to match as well as possible. Conversely, the first solution is the one which has 
been decided in France in July 2006. Nevertheless, recent papers from other countries which 
had previously decided such policies catch the doubt on the efficiency of this type of disposal 
(Borjas, 2001; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 2008). Firstly it could bring us to a cancellation of the 
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main streams of entries (for France that would mean less immigrants from North Africa 
mainly) without inducing more flows from people and/or countries with the desired abilities 
and characteristics. And yet, a global decrease in migration inflows would not be a good thing 
for us as a growing number of papers show (Borgy & Chojnicki, 2010). The latter proposals 
on migration policies recommend instead of a quantitative migration policy a softening of the 
conditions to enter conditionally to prove an adequacy between the host labor market and 
one’s abilities and also to encourage temporary migrations. This last disposal is expected to 
rationalize naturally the inflow (as people will know they would be able to enter the borders 
again without institutional difficulties, they won’t stay more longer than they expected at the 
beginning of their project, (see Noiriel 2006b and Wihtol de Wenden, 2009)) and at the same 
time to favor more exchanges (capital and human capital exchanges and remittances) with the 
source countries so as to offer it some additional resources to develop. Some other questions 
on the role of the international financial aiding effort in order to develop poor countries also 
hold here (United Nations, 2005; Gubert & Giordano, 2006). Thus, another present point in 
the literature faces then the question of the best way to achieve the development question: 
should the rich countries mostly give money through the aiding effort (see the millennium 
goals for example), or should they encourage remittances through a financial deregulation, or 
shall they “simply” welcome larger numbers of international immigrants? 
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List of the tables and appendix: 
Table 1: distribution according to the place of birth  
Birth area Number Percentage Cumulated number % cumulated 
France 
(Metropolitan) 
14 811 86,81 14 811 86,81 
French overseas 
departments and 
territories (FODT) 
136 0,8 14 947 87,61 
EU-15 686 4,02 15 633 91,63 
EU-25 43 0,25 15 676 91,88 
Maghreb 743 4,35 16 419 96,24 
Other Africa 247 1,45 16 666 97,68 
Other 395 2,32 17 061 100,00 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
 
 
Table 2: distribution according to the nationality 
Birth area Number Percentage Cumulated number % cumulated 
Born French 15 365 90,06 15 365 90,06 
Naturalized French 722 4,23 16 087 94,30 
Naturalized UE-15 403 2,36 16 490 96,66 
Naturalized UE-25 10 0,06 16 500 96,72 
Naturalized 
Maghreb 
257 1,51 16 757 98,22 
Naturalized Africa 
other Maghreb 
106 0,62 16 863 98,85 
Other/Stateless 197 1,15 17 060 100,00 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
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Table 3: Distribution by age according to the grouped countries of birth 
  18-29 
years old 
30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and + Total 
Born in 
France 
Number 1786 3116 3041 2878 4072 14 893 
%  11,99 20,92 20,42 19,32 27,34 100% 
Born in a 
foreign 
country 
Number 201 397 512 469 589 2168 
%  9,27 18,31 23,62 21,63 27,17 100% 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
 
Table 4: skill level according to the geographical origin 
  High 
School 
Degree 
+5 
years 
and 
more 
High 
School 
Degree+3+4 
High 
School 
Degree+2 
High 
School 
Degree 
Professional 
degree (less 
than High 
School 
degree) 
Secondary 
school 
 
Total 
Born in 
France 
Number 144 2038 1386 1938 4325 5116 14 947 
Line % 0,96 13,63 9,27 12,97 28,94 34,23 100% 
Total 
born 
abroad 
Number 14 354 122 241 329 1054 2114 
Line %  0,68 17,03 5,87 11,54 15,38  49% 100% 
Born in 
EU 
Number 4 105 31 63 116 410 729 
Line %  0,55 14,40 4,25 8,64 15,91 56,24 100% 
Born in 
Maghreb 
Number 3 98 38 82 139 383 743 
Line %  0,40 13,19 5,11 11,04 18,71 51,55 100% 
Born in 
Africa 
Number 7 151 53 96 74 261 642 
Line %  1,09 23,52 8,26 14,95 11,53 40,65 100% 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
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Table 5: Main situation with regard to the labor market 
 Hold 
a job 
Apprentice/pai
d work 
experience 
Studen
t 
unemploye
d 
retire
d 
Housewife/ 
househusban
d 
Other
13
 
 
Total 
Born in France:  
- Number 
 (% among natives) 
 
8601 
57,5
4 
 
31 
0,21 
 
252 
1,69 
 
796 
5,33 
 
3982 
26,64 
 
972 
6,50 
 
313 
2,09 
 
1494
7 
100% 
Total migrants, 
- Number 
 (% among 
migrants) 
Whose: 
 
1038 
  
49,4
1 
 
3 
0,14 
 
43 
2,11 
 
218 
10,45 
 
478 
22,03 
 
284 
13,49 
 
50 
2,37 
 
2114 
100% 
        Born in EU:  
- Number 
 (% among UE) 
 
370 
50,7
5 
 
1 
0,14 
 
7 
0,96 
 
39 
5,35 
 
219 
30,04 
 
75 
10,29 
 
18 
2,47 
 
729 
100% 
      Born in North 
Africa:  
- Number 
 (% migrants north 
afr.) 
 
311 
41,8
6 
 
1 
0,13 
 
11 
1,48 
 
88 
11,84 
 
203 
27,32 
 
112 
15,07 
 
17 
2,29 
 
743 
100% 
      Born in Other 
Africa:  
- Number 
 (% migrants Afr. 
and other) 
 
357 
55,6
1 
 
1 
0,16 
 
25 
3,89 
 
91 
14,17 
 
56 
8,72 
 
97 
15,11 
 
15 
2,34 
 
642 
100% 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
 
Table 6: job situation of the working population 
 Apprent. Temporary 
jobs 
Paid 
training 
Public 
financed 
job 
“CDD” Full-
time 
“CDI” 
Part-
time 
“CDI” 
Sum of 
occupied 
people 
Born in France :  
- Number 
 (% among natives) 
 
21 
0,27 
 
93 
1,20 
 
19 
0,25 
 
73 
0,94 
 
566 
7,31 
 
5854 
75,59 
 
1118 
14,44 
 
7744 
100% 
Total of migrants, 
- Number 
 (% among migrants) 
With:  
 
1 
0,12 
 
19 
2,03 
 
2 
0,21 
 
5 
0,53 
 
101 
11,05 
 
655 
71,11 
 
138 
14,94 
 
921 
100% 
 
        Migrants Born in EU:  
- Number 
 (% among migrants EU) 
 
0 
    0,00 
 
5 
1,55 
 
2 
0,62 
 
1 
0,31 
 
26 
8,05 
 
237 
73,37 
 
52 
16,10 
 
323 
100% 
      Born in North Africa:  
- Number 
 (% among migrants North 
Afr.) 
 
1 
0,36 
 
4 
1,45 
 
0 
0,00 
 
1 
0,36 
 
35 
12,73 
 
195 
70,91 
 
39 
14,18 
 
275 
100% 
      Born in other africa:  
- Number 
 (% among migrants Other 
Afr.) 
 
0 
0,00 
 
10 
3,10 
 
0 
0,00 
 
3 
0,93 
 
40 
12,38 
 
223 
69,04 
 
47 
14,55 
 
323 
100% 
Source: Statistics from the authors using the BdF06 survey. 
 
                                                        
13
 Handicapped persons, etc. 
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Table 7: probabilities of being a beneficiary of the welfare system according to the 
geographical origin 
 Born in 
France 
Born in 
EU 
Born in 
North Afr. 
Born in 
Afr (oth) 
total 
Retirement 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line % 
 
4599 
30,77* 
88,65** 
 
267 
36,63 
5,15 
 
248 
33,38 
4,78 
 
74 
11,53 
1,43 
 
5188 
Basic familial assistance 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line % 
 
3512 
23,52 
84,97 
 
165 
22,73 
3,99 
 
200 
26,95 
4,84 
 
256 
39,94 
6,19 
 
4133 
Family benefits and scholarships 
- Number 
- Column % 
- Line % 
 
3768 
25,21 
84,50 
 
175 
24,01 
3,92 
 
235 
31,63 
5,27 
 
281 
43,77 
6,30 
 
4459 
Ills 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line % 
 
834 
5,58 
86,34 
 
60 
8,23 
6,21 
 
48 
6,46 
4,97 
 
24 
3,74 
2,48 
 
966 
Housing assistance 
- Number 
- Column % 
-  Line % 
 
2042 
13,66 
78,57 
 
86 
11,80 
3,31 
 
254 
34,19 
9,77 
 
217 
33,80 
8,35 
 
2599 
Unemployment benefits 
- Number 
- Column % 
-  Line % 
 
1747 
11,69 
82,72 
 
98 
13,44 
4,64 
 
138 
18,57 
6,53 
 
129 
20,09 
6,11 
 
2112 
RMI 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line % 
 
338 
2,26 
71,31 
 
17 
2,33 
3,59 
 
63 
8,48 
13,29 
 
56 
8,72 
11,81 
 
474 
Source: Statistics from the authors. 
*30.77% of individuals born in France benefit from an old pension. 
**Among people who receive an old pension, 88.65% are French people. 
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Table 8: Results (Odds Ratios) of the empirical estimations 
 
Reference 
Var 
Var Housing Health Family Pension Unemployment RMI 
Sex
hom
 Sex fem  0,982 0,683 0,875
c
 1,411
a
 0,989 1,223
c
 
Age
30"39
 
Age
18"29
 2,191
a
 0,363
a
 0,958 0,918 1,257
a
 1,491
b
 
Age
40"49
 0,521
a
 1,800
a
 0,498
a
 2,364
a
 0,851
a
 0,954 
Age
50"59
 0,364
a
 3,207
a
 0,157
a
 11,339
a
 0,858
b
 0,721
b
 
Age
60+
 0,379
a
 0,952 0,068
a
 701,296
a
 0,177
a
 - 
Nais fra  
Nais
eur
 0,950 1,294
c
 1,046 0,578
a
 1,371
a
 0,973 
Naismaghreb
 2,965
a
 0,829 1,418
b
 0,760
c
 1,835
a
 3,670
a
 
Naisafr& autre
 1,870
a
 0,670
c
 1,273 0,350
a
 1,624
a
 3,765
a
 
Nbenf
0
 
Nbenf
1
 1,364
a
 1,697
a
 Ref var. 0,548
a
 1,409
a
 1,604
a
 
Nbenf
2
 2,462
a
 1,063 27,5
a
 0,262
a
 1,071
a
 1,639
a
 
Nbenf
3
 5,755 0,824 74,2
a
 0,286
a
 1,671 2,843
a
 
 10,123 1,484
c
 173,6
a
 0,307
a
 1,630
a
 4,722
a
 
 
 - - - 1,606
a
 1,238
a
 1,888 
 - - - 2,191
a
 1,565
a
 4,350 
 
 0,992 1,269
c
 1,598
a
 - 1,139 1,227 
 1,350
a
 1,323
b
 1,552
a
 - 1,299
a
 1,401 
 1,865
a
 1,128 1,353
a
 - 1,440
a
 2,451
a
 
 1,904
a
 1,428
a
 1,611
a
 - 1,105 2,733
a
 
 
 - - (excluded) 0,370
a
 1,384 3,556
a
 
 - - 0,920 0,187
a
 0,956 3,322
a
 
 - - Ref var. 0,306
a
 1,352 5,683
a
 
   1,392    
Cat _ soc
3
 
 4,182
a
 1,826 1,470 - - - 
 4,863
a
 2,232
b
 0,896 - - - 
 2,440
a
 1,946
a
 1,082 - - - 
Cat _ soc
5
 7,675
a
 3,485
a
 1,032 - - - 
Cat _ soc
6
 4,238
a
 11,093
a
 1,070 - - - 
Cat _ soc
7
 5,736
a
 17,910
a
 1,098 - - - 
Situa
1
 
Situa
2
 9,625
a 
- - - - - 
Situa
3
 5,234
a
 - - - - - 
Situa
4
 4,944
a
 - - - - - 
Situa
5
 1,623
c
 - - - - - 
Situa
6
 2,349
a
 - - - - - 
Situa
7
 6,920
a
 - - - - - 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: type of household according to the geographical origin 
 Single 
person  
Single-parent 
family 
Couple 
without 
child 
Couple 
with at 
least 1 
child 
Other Total 
Born in France:  
- Number 
 (% among natives) 
 
2444 
16,35 
 
747 
5,00 
 
5185 
34,69 
 
5940 
39,74 
 
631 
4,22 
 
14947 
100% 
Total of migrants: 
- Number 
 (% among migrants) 
With : 
 
262 
12,33 
 
124 
5,85 
 
605 
28,34 
 
960 
45,6 
 
163 
7,88 
 
2114 
100% 
        Born in UE:  
- Number 
 (% among Europeans) 
 
84 
11,52 
 
32 
4,39 
 
273 
37,45 
 
300 
41,15 
 
40 
5,49 
 
729 
100% 
      Born in Maghreb:  
- Number 
 (% among North African) 
 
107 
    14,40 
 
55 
7,40 
 
195 
26,24 
 
338 
45,49 
 
48 
6,46 
 
743 
100% 
      Born in Africa or other:  
- Number 
 (% among African and other) 
 
71 
11,06 
 
37 
5,76 
 
137 
21,34 
 
322 
50,16 
 
75 
11,68 
 
642 
100% 
 
Appendix 2: number of individuals in the household 
  1 person 2 persons 3 persons 4 persons 5 persons 
and + 
Total 
Born in 
France 
Number 2432 5764 2617 2681 1399 14 893 
%  16,33 38,70 17,57 18,00 9,39 100% 
Born 
abroad 
Number 274 712 370 396 416 2168 
%  12,64 32,84 17,07 18,27 19,19 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
Appendix 3: unemployment benefits and RMI by nationality 
 French 
born 
French by 
acquisition 
of the 
nationality 
Other 
European 
Algerian, 
Moroccan 
or 
Tunisian 
Other 
African 
people and 
other 
nationalities 
Stateless 
and 
others 
Total 
Unemployment 
benefits 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line %  
 
1798 
11,70 
85,13 
 
126 
17,45 
5,97 
 
59 
14,29 
2,79 
 
69 
26,85 
3,27 
 
20 
18,87 
0,95 
 
40 
20,30 
1,89 
 
2112 
RMI 
- Number 
- Column %  
- Line %  
 
354 
2,30 
74,68 
 
41 
5,68 
8,65 
 
8 
1,94 
1,69 
 
35 
13,62 
7,38 
 
19 
17,92 
4,01 
 
17 
8,63 
3,59 
 
474 
Total 14947 729 743 642   17060* 
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Appendix 4: Results of the estimation model for housing benefits and health benefits 
           Dep. Var.  
Expl. Var.                         
Housing allocations
 
Illness allocations 
ref.    Coef.  Odd ratio  Coef.  Odd ratio 
 
  ‐0,019  0,982  ‐0,381  0,683 
  (0,053)    (0,073)   
 
  0,784***  2,191  ‐1,012***  0,363 
  (0,081)    (0,220)   
  ‐0,652***  0,521  0,588***  1,800 
  (0,070)    (0,132)   
  ‐1,011***  0,364  1,165***  3,207 
  (0,092)    (0,134)   
  ‐0,971***  0,379  ‐0,049  0,952 
  (0,147)    (0,163)   
 
  ‐0,052  0,950  0,257*  1,294 
  (0,131)    (0,145)   
  1,087***  2,965  ‐0,188  0,829 
  (0,101)    (0,163)   
  0,626***  1,870  ‐0,400*  0,670 
  (0,108)    (0,221)   
 
  0,310***  1,364  0,529***  1,697 
  (0,075)    (0,092)   
  0,901***  2,462  0,061  1,063 
  (0,901)    (0,122)   
  1,750  5,755  ‐0,194  0,824 
  (0,091)    (0,178)   
  2,315  10,123  0,394*  1,484 
  (0,132)    (0,215)   
 
  1,431***  4,182  0,602  1,826 
  (0,272)    (0,417)   
  1,582***  4,863  0,803$**  2,232 
  (0,195)    (0,311)   
  0,892***  2,440  0,666***  1,946 
  (0,153)    (0,239)   
  2,038***  7,675  1,249***  3,485 
  (0,140)    (0,216)   
  1,444***  4,238  2,406***  11,093 
  (0,297)    (0,225)   
  1,747***  5,736  2,886***  17,910 
  (0,265)    (0,223)   
 
  2,264***  9,625  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,391)       
  1,655***  5,234  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,248)       
  1,598***  4,944  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,084)       
  0,484*  1,623  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,285)       
  0,854***  2,349  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,248)       
  1,934***  6,920  ‐  ‐ 
  (0,268)       
 
  ‐0,008  0,992  0,239*  1,269 
  (0,092)    (0,126)   
  0,301***  1,350  0,280**  1,323 
  (0,095)    (0,132)   
 45 
 
Hab
20m"100m
  0,623***  1,865  0,120  1,128 
  (0,096)    (0,146)   
Hab
100m"2mllion
  0,644***  1,904  0,356***  1,428 
  (0,084)    (0,123)   
  Const.  ‐4,326    ‐5,043***   
    (0,163)    (0,254)   
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Appendix 5: Results of the estimation model for familial assistance and old pensions 
           Dep.Var.  
Expl Var                               
Familial Allocations
 
Old pensions
 
Ref    Coef.  Odd ratio  Coef.  Odd ratio 
Sex
hom
  Sex fem
  ‐0,133*  0,875  0,344***  1,411 
  (0,069)    (0,067)   
Age
30"39
 
Age
18"29
  ‐0,042  0,958  ‐0,085  0,918 
  (0,121)    (0,272)   
Age
40"49
  ‐0,697***  0,498  0,861***  2,364 
  (0,078)    (0,193)   
Age
50"59
  ‐1,850***  0,157  2,428***  11,339 
  (0,106)    (0,178)   
Age
60+
  ‐2,690***  0,068  6,553***  701,296 
  (0,270)    (0,190)   
Nais fra
 
Nais
eur
  0,045  1,046  ‐0,547***  0,578 
  (0,161)    (0,151)   
Naismaghreb
  0,349**  1,418  ‐0,275*  0,760 
  (0,154)    (0,155)   
Naisafr& autre
  0,242  1,273  ‐1,051***  0,350 
  (0,151)    (0,221)   
Nbenf0 
(ou  
Nbenf1 
pour le 
modèle 
Rfam)#
 
Nbenf
1
  Ref    ‐0,602***  0,548 
      (0,085)   
Nbenf
2
  3,314***  27,492  ‐1,338***  0,262 
  (0,078)    (0,132)   
Nbenf
3
  4,307***  74,222  ‐1,253***  0,286 
  (0,115)    (0,199)   
Nbenf
4+
  5,157***  173,620  ‐1,181***  0,307 
  (0,234)    (0,304)   
Cat _ soc
3
 
Cat _ soc
1
  0,386  1,470  /   
  (0,251)       
Cat _ soc
2
  ‐0,109  0,896  /   
  (0,179)       
Cat _ soc
4
  0,079  1,082  /   
  (0,112)       
Cat _ soc
5
  0,032  1,032  /   
  (0,102)       
Cat _ soc
6
  0,068  1,070  /   
  (0,254)       
Cat _ soc
7
  0,094  1,098  /   
  (0,142)       
matrmarié 
(ou 
matrdivorcé 
pour le 
modèle 
Rfam)## 
matrcélib  Exclus    ‐0,995***  0,370 
  /    (0,123)   
matrveuf  0,330  0,920  ‐1,677***  0,187 
  (0,258)    (0,118)   
matridivorcé  Ref    ‐1,184***  0,306 
      (0,125)   
matrmarié  ‐0,083  1,392  Ref   
  (0,078)       
Hab
Paris
 
Hab
rur
  0,469***  1,598  /   
  (0,106)       
Hab
5m"20m
  0,439***  1,552  /   
  (0,114)       
Hab
20m"100m
  0,302***  1,353  /   
  (0,125)       
Hab
100m"2mllion
  0,477***  1,611  /   
  (0,104)       
Dipetu sup  Dipbac,cap,bep  /    0,474***  1,606 
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      (0,101)   
Dipbepc,0  /    0,785***  2,191 
      (0,100)   
  Const.  ‐1,841    ‐3,901   
    (0,143)    (0,195)   
  Nber Obs.  8208    17061   
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Appendix 6: Results of the estimation model for unemployment benefits and the RMI 
 
           Dep Var.               
  
Expl. Var.                         
Unempl. Beneifts  RMI 
Ref    Coef.  Odd ratio  Coef.  Odd ratio 
Sex
hom
  Sex fem
  ‐0,011  0,989  0,202*  1,223 
  (0,048)    (0,111)   
Age
30"39
 
Age
18"29#  0,229***  1,257  0,400**  1,491 
  (0,079)    (0,177)   
Age
40"49
  ‐0,161***  0,851  ‐0,047  0,954 
  (0,068)    (0,135)   
Age
50"59
  ‐0,153**  0,858  ‐0,327**  0,721 
  (0,078)    (0,165)   
Age
60+
  ‐1,732***  0,177  /   
  (0,115)       
Nais fra  
Nais
eur
  0,316***  1,371  ‐0,028  0,973 
  (0,116)    (0,319)   
Naismaghreb
  0,607***  1,835  1,310***  3,670 
  (0,104)    (0,173)   
Naisafr& autre
  0,485***  1,624  1,326***  3,765 
  (0,108)    (0,180)   
Nbenf
0
 
Nbenf
1
  0,343***  1,409  0,472***  1,604 
  (0,065)    (0,152)   
Nbenf
2
  0,068  1,071  0,494***  1,639 
  (0,075)    (0,160)   
Nbenf
3
  0,513***  1,671  1,045***  2,843 
  (0,090)    (0,182)   
Nbenf
4+
  0,488***  1,630  1,552***  4,722 
  (0,138)    (0,215)   
Dipletu sup. 
Diplbac,cap,bep   0,213***  1,238  0,636***  1,888 
  (0,062)    (0,167)   
Diplbepc,0   0,448***  1,565  1,470***  4,350 
  (0,069)    (0,166)   
H
Pa is
 
 
Hab
rur
  0,130  1,139  0,205  1,227 
  (0,082)    (0,210)   
Hab
5m"20m
  0,262***  1,299  0,337  1,401 
  (0,086)    (0,215)   
Hab
20m"100m
  0,364***  1,440  0,896***  2,451 
  (0,089)    (0,199)   
Hab
100m"2mllion
  0,100  1,105  1,005***  2,733 
  (0,078)    (0,176)   
 
Matr
marié
 
Matr
celib
  0,325***  1,384  1,269***  3,556 
  (0,065)    (0,139)   
Matrveuf   ‐0,046  0,956  1,201***  3,322 
  (0,149)    (0,308)   
Matr
divorcé
  0,301***  1,352  1,737***  5,683 
  (0,088)    (0,150)   
  Const.  ‐2,362***  ‐  ‐6,163***  ‐ 
    (0,105)    (0,267)   
  Nber Obs.  17061  ‐  11866  ‐ 
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/ 
           Dep.var.                   
  
Expl.Var.                          
Probability 
Ref.    Coef.  Odd ratio 
Sex
hom
  Sex fem
  ‐0,008  0,992 
  (0,048)   
Age
30"39
 
Age
18"29#  0,223***  1,250 
  (0,079)   
Age
40"49
  ‐0,144**  0,866 
  (0,068)   
Age
50"59
  ‐0,137*  0,872 
  (0,078)   
Age
60+
  ‐1,713***  0,180 
  (0,115)   
Natiofrançai
s  
naiss
 
Nationaturalisé
  0,524***  1,689 
  (0,107)   
NatioUE  0,271*  1,312 
  (0,148)   
NatioMaghreb  0,812***  2,252 
  (0,152)   
Natioautre +Afriq  0,246  1,279 
  (0,257)   
Natioapatride  0,437***  1,548 
  (0,186)   
Nbenf
0
 
Nbenf
1
  0,342***  1,408 
  (0,065)   
Nbenf
2
  0,064  1,066 
  (0,075)   
Nbenf
3
  0,507***  1,660 
  (0,091)   
Nbenf
4+
  0,491***  1,633 
  (0,138)   
i etu sup. 
Diplbac,cap,bep   0,202***  1,224 
  (0,062)   
iplbepc,0   0,430***  1,538 
  (0,069)   
Hab
Paris
 
 
Hab
rur
  0,120  1,127 
  (0,082)   
Hab
5m"20m
  0,247***  1,280 
  (0,086)   
Hab
20m"100m
  0,359***  1,432 
  (0,089)   
Hab
100m"2mllion
  0,093  1,097 
  (0,078)   
 
Matr
marié
 
Matr
celib
  0,329***  1,389 
  (0,065)   
Matrveuf   ‐0,051  0,950 
  (0,149)   
Matr
divorcé
  0,303***  1,354 
  (0,088)   
  Const.  ‐2,343***  ‐ 
    (0,105)   
  Nber Obs.  17061  ‐ 
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